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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of agglomeration on productivity is of central importance to the economy and 
has been extensively researched. Extant studies find, in general, that density has a 
positive influence on total factor productivity to compensate for an increase in costs.1 
However, while productivity is an important feature of agglomeration it is not the 
primary element firms in competitive industries aim at. A positive relation between 
productivity and density should not drive location choice if the drawbacks of 
agglomeration more than eliminate the advantages of higher total factor productivity. The 
elimination of this advantage is not imaginary, as density generally increases real estate 
costs and wages (Glaeser and Mare, 2001), which are the two main operating costs of 
companies (Brounen and Eichholtz, 2005). This paper empirically tests the tradeoff 
between the costs and benefits of agglomeration. Since these are not limited to land rent, 
wages, and productivity, we need a variable that measures the net effect of costs and 
benefits. This measure is a firm’s profitability. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the 
relation between density and profitability.2  
According to the well-known concept of spatial equilibrium there should be no 
positive or negative relation between density and profitability. Higher (lower) 
profitability in denser areas should attract (distract) companies to (from) these areas until 
equilibrium is restored. However, the presence of amenities that enrich the life of firms’ 
decision makers is likely to result in decisions that are not solely focused on maximizing 
a firm’s profits. Especially for firms where decision makers need to live close to their 
business, practical and behavioral reasons exist why firms locate in areas that are not 
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financially optimal. For example, Glaeser (2007) argues that moving costs and spatial 
preferences of the CEOs result in non-perfect profit maximalization at the firm level. We 
therefore treat the relation between density and financial performance as an empirical 
question. 
Ideally, a test of this relation exclusively incorporates single-establishment firms. In 
these firms, the decision makers are generally physically present at the firm’s location. 
Also, examining single-establishment firms excludes the effect of firms that are located in 
various areas with different density levels: the performance of these firms cannot be 
attributed solely to the density of the headquarters location. By exploiting a database with 
information on firms’ locations and their financial performance, we are the first to 
empirically test the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of agglomeration for single-
establishment firms.  
Our country of analysis is the Netherlands. Several reasons make this country an 
interesting basis for analysis. First, the Netherlands ranks high in population density 
when compared to other countries in the world. Bangladesh and Taiwan are the only 
countries with a population above ten million that show higher population density. 
Despite the high overall population density there is a large dispersion of urbanization 
across the Netherlands. Consequently, urbanization differences are an important factor in 
settlement choices for Dutch firms. A second factor that makes the Netherlands an 
interesting market for analysis is the availability of unique and very detailed information 
on both the company and the geographic level. The company data set comprises financial 
information of a large number of private companies, which facilitates a wide analysis of 
the potential effects. Detailed geographic information originates from the Dutch Central 
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Bureau of Statistics and includes employment, land use, and land area information on two 
levels of geographic aggregation.  
Our sample consists of 13,161 privately owned firms for which financial information 
is available.3 Regarding the relations between agglomeration and productivity, we 
corroborate results of other papers (e.g., Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002): density 
and productivity are positively related. Doubling the density increases the turnover per 
employee on average with 6.0% for firms included in our sample. We further find 
evidence that the labor costs per employee and land costs rise with density. More 
specifically, we find the labor costs per employee to rise with 6.3% when the population 
density doubles, while land costs increase with 42.0% for a doubling of the population 
density.  
Productivity, wages, and land costs are not the only three factors that relate to density. 
Other benefits and costs include insurance costs, transportation costs, and labor 
availability. To examine the combined effect of these benefits and costs, we focus on a 
firm’s profitability, as measured by the five-year average of a firm’s return on assets. We 
make the distinction between effects related to urbanization (density of general economic 
activity) and localization (density of industry specific employment).  
For urbanization, we find that density has a negative effect on firms’ profitability. For 
Corop areas, which are equal to EuroStat’s Nuts 3 regions, a doubling of the employment 
density will decrease the average return on assets by more than one percentage point. The 
same goes for density measures that focus on the number of inhabitants or addresses in an 
area. The negative relation between density and performance is also present in an analysis 
on the municipality level, although with lower coefficients and significance levels.  
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We test the effect of localization by examining industry-related effects. We find 
significantly negative effects between density and performance for firms in the 
‘construction’ and ‘wholesale and trade’ industry. For other industries we also find 
negative signs, but the relations are not statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.  
We further examine whether the presence of amenities that enrich the life of firms’ 
decision makers is likely to result in decisions that are not solely focused on maximizing 
a firm’s profits. If entrepreneurs balance their firms’ profitability and the general quality 
of life, we expect that firms in municipalities with a high liveability score have a lower 
average profitability than firms in municipalities with a low score. We find that the 
relation between a liveability index and firm performance is indeed significantly 
negative, indicating that the living preferences of owners provides one potential 
explanation for our findings. The negative relation between liveability scores and 
performance also explains why our results can pertain over time. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by combining empirical tests of the costs and 
benefits of agglomeration. Given that the majority of prior work deals with the relation 
between density and productivity – a relation which is generally found to be positive – 
the positive effects of agglomeration are overrepresented in the literature. By 
incorporating potential costs of agglomeration in our tests, we show that the net effect of 
settling in high density areas is on average negative. These findings potentially explain 
recent trends of deconcentration of employment (Carlino and Chatterjee, 2001). 
However, we stress that our test is based on an examination of single-establishment firms. 
For firms with multiple establishments, like virtually every public firm, and knowledge 
intensive industries the choice of (headquarter) location might strongly depend on 
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prestige and skilled labor availability. Also, our results are based on one country, and this 
country has a high density, but is relatively small. Most firms in rural areas in the 
Netherlands are still within a one hour drive from a large city. Further research is 
necessary to examine the relation between agglomeration and firm performance in larger 
countries.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start with a description of the 
agglomeration literature in Section 2. Section 3 provides a description of our data. In 
Section 4 we examine the benefits and costs of agglomeration. Our analysis on 
agglomeration and profitability is presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides additional 
analyses regarding our measures of density and financial performance, and examines 
firms’ cost of capital. In Section 7 we examine potential explanations for our results, and 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature on the effects of agglomeration 
 
Differences in total factor productivity as a result of unequal urbanization and 
localization across locations has been at the heart of urban economics at least since 
Marshall (1920) discussed technological spillovers between adjacent firms. Traditionally, 
cities emerged near natural transportation nodes and natural resources. With the advent of 
industrialization, firms started to benefit from communal presence and the benefits of 
face to face contact between firms and clients (see, for example, Archer and Smith, 2003; 
Clapp, 1980; Dunse and Jones, 2002; and Mills, 2004). However, the post-industrial era 
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brings advancements in technology that might diminish the need for cities as a ground for 
knowledge spillovers (Bollinger et al., 1998).4  
A simple model introduced by Roback (1982) shows how wages and land rents 
interact to allocate workers to locations with various quantities of amenities. In 
equilibrium, with both capital and labor completely mobile across cities, the combination 
of wages and land rents in each location satisfies two conditions. The first condition 
relates to workers and shows that locations with a high level of unproductive amenities 
have high rents to avoid overconcentration of workers. No arbitrage relations require that 
individuals must be indifferent across space if the flow of wages plus amenities minus 
housing costs and transportation costs is taken into account (Glaeser, 2007). The second, 
or firm condition, states that the presence of unproductive amenities requires low land 
rents to attract firms. Firms are indifferent over space when the spatial equilibrium 
condition holds that the unit cost equals product price and differences in wages are offset 
by differences in total factor productivity.  
Existing studies that focus on the effect of agglomeration on productivity can be 
divided into a localization and urbanization strand. Localization typically relates to 
clusters. A cluster is a critical mass of companies in a particular field in a particular 
location, whether it is a country, state or even a city (Porter, 1998). According to Porter, 
productivity can be increased by improving factor inputs in efficiency and quality which 
should ultimately result in cluster areas with high levels of specialization.  
The second strand of literature related to agglomeration economies focuses on 
urbanization. More specifically, it deals with the relation between the density of 
economic activity and productivity. Density of economic activity is a measure for the 
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intensity of labor and human and physical capital within a confined geographic area. 
Early work in this field studies agglomeration economies by relating city size to 
technological spillovers (for a discussion of this literature, see Ciccone and Hall, 1996). 
Henderson (1974) shows that, in equilibrium, disamenities on the side of households 
because of agglomeration, such as for example congestion, pollution, and crime, are 
offset by productivity advances for competitive firms. These productivity advances can 
lead to high sustainable profits, which are partly redirected towards the employees in the 
form of higher wages. Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002) study agglomeration 
effects by linking employment density to labor productivity for US states and European 
Nuts 3 regions, respectively. Ciccone and Hall (1996) measure productivity as the Gross 
State Output per acre for 46 states and the District of Columbia, while Ciccone (2002) 
uses value added at factor costs and salaried employment for 628 Nuts 3 regions in 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. These studies show that doubling of 
employment density raises average labor productivity approximately 6 percent in the US, 
while agglomeration effects in Europe are slightly smaller. Carlino et al. (2007) link 
urban density to the rate of invention, and find that doubling the employment density 
increases the patents per capita by 20%. 
However, besides agglomeration benefits there are also diseconomies of 
agglomeration on the firm level. Typically, density is associated with higher wage and 
accommodation costs. Glaeser and Mare (2001) show for example that employees who 
live in cities earn a wage premium of 33% over workers that do not live in metropolitan 
areas. Accommodation costs, which are a function of land rents, rise with population 
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density in line with ideas that date back to von Thünen (1862). Other negative effects of 
agglomeration are for example higher pollution and crime, and related insurance costs.  
 
3. Data 
 
In this section we introduce the data used in our empirical analysis. For the 
calculation of firm level performance we employ a sample of Dutch firms from Bureau 
van Dijk’s REACH database. This database provides information on Dutch firms, and is 
survivor-bias free: the database still contains data on firms that do not exist anymore.5 
Our first selection comprises firms for which the REACH database reports profitability 
(ebitda), which are 32,553 organizations. We delete firms that do not report their location, 
and exclude financial institutions and utilities because of problems associated with 
measuring leverage and return on assets for these industries. We further exclude firms 
that are listed, firms that have multiple establishments, and firms that migrated to an area 
with a different density in the last eight years of their reporting. In addition, we exclude 
firms with names that include the words ‘holding’, ‘group’, ‘international’, ‘Europe’, or 
its Dutch equivalents. Our final sample, after truncating variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentile, comprises 13,161 firms. Fig. 1 shows the dispersion of these firms across the 
Netherlands based on the six digit postal code coordinates.  Although the observations are 
widely spread across the country, the majority of observations are in the mid-west of the 
Netherlands.  
 
[ please insert Figure 1 here ] 
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We define our profitability measure as the five-year average of the return on assets. 
The returns on assets are the earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (ebitda) 
divided by the total assets at the end of the book-year. We compute the five-year average 
of the return on assets for the final year in which the firm is included in the REACH 
database. Hence, each firm only appears once in our sample. Industries are selected in 
line with the statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community, Rev. 1.1 (2002), which is comparable to the SIC code in the US. We include 
various control variables in our regression estimation on density and profitability, like a 
firm’s size, industry, leverage, age, and risk. We control for a firm’s age as profitability is 
generally related to the life cycle of a firm. We also include a proxy for risk as risky firms 
are expected to obtain higher average return on assets. The risk profile of a company is 
calculated by taking the standard deviation of the reported profits (ebitda) over the last 
five years.  
Besides firm information we also employ various sets of aggregated and 
disaggregated geographic and employment data. Physical space in our empirical analysis 
is defined as either municipalities or Corop areas. For each Corop area we gather the 
number of employees per industry per year since 1995 from the EuroStat database. 
Further geographic information used in our analysis includes the total land area of each 
municipality and Corop region. We employ these data to calculate employment density 
statistics. 
We measure urbanization with three different variables which are employment, 
population, and address density. Employment and population density are respectively the 
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number of employees or inhabitants per square kilometer of land area within a 
municipality or Corop region. Relative differences between these two measures of 
agglomeration exist if the population is ageing, when there is a high number of 
inhabitants below working age, residential areas are basically dormitory towns, or when 
the economic circumstances result in high local unemployment rates. Address density is a 
measure for the concentration of human activity. It measures the average number of 
addresses (including residential, commercial, and public properties) in a one kilometer 
radius area around each address within the defined agglomeration. We measure 
localization as the number of full time equivalent employees for each industry within 
Corop areas and municipalities per square kilometer of land.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables in our study. We report individual 
sample statistics instead of common sample statistics as different combinations of 
variables appear in the various regression models of this paper. 
 
[ please insert Table 1 here ] 
 
The median size of the firms in our sample, measured as the value of total assets, is € 
4.265 million. Given that these firms are privately owned, we observe a relatively high 
median leverage of 0.699. The median firm age is 19 years, and the median five-year 
return on assets is just over 10 percent. The median number of employees per km2 is 368 
in a Corop area and 606 in municipalities.  
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Fig. 2 shows the dispersion of population density across the country on a Corop and 
municipality level. A comparison of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 shows that areas with high 
population density share high firm density.  
 
[ please insert Figure 2 here ] 
 
The dispersion of density measures across the country is high. Clearly visible is the high 
concentration of population in the west, an area known as the Randstad (including the 
cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht). Another densely populated area 
is the most southern part of the country. Low density areas appear in the more rural 
northern and eastern parts of the Netherlands. 
 
4. Costs and benefits of agglomeration 
 
In Section 2 we discussed prior work indicating that density positively influences total 
factor productivity. To test the relation between density and productivity for the firms in 
our sample, we regress the turnover per employee on the total number of employees 
within the firm. To examine a downside of agglomeration we test whether wages and 
land rent are higher in densely populated areas. 
 
4.1 Testing the benefits of agglomeration  
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When testing the relation between employment density and turnover per employee for 
the firms in our sample, we control for firm size, firm age, and industry effects. We set 
the firm age variable to twenty for observations with firm age values above twenty, since 
firms are likely to have reached maturity by then. Throughout the paper, we will employ 
geographically clustered standard errors. This means that we cluster standard errors by 
Corop when we estimate an effect of density for Corop regions, and cluster standard 
errors by municipality when we estimate an effect of density for municipalities.   
 
[ please insert Table 2 here ] 
 
In general, the results point towards a positive relation between productivity and 
industry specific employment density: the coefficient of the effect of urbanization on 
productivity is positive on both the Corop and the municipality level. The influence on 
the municipality level is however not statistically significant. In a Corop area, doubling 
the location density – in terms of employees per km2 – increases the productivity by 
6.0%.6 The influence of neighboring areas is larger on the municipality level which could 
be the reason for noise in our findings for municipalities. Larger firms have a higher 
productivity, ceteris paribus, whereas the age of the firm has a negative impact on the 
turnover per employee.  
 
4.2 Testing the costs of agglomeration 
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To examine potential downsides of agglomeration we test whether the employment 
costs per employee and the land price per square meter are higher in dense areas for the 
firms in our sample. Although employment and land costs are only two of the downsides, 
they are potentially the most influential as they constitute some of the main costs of 
companies.7 Table 3 shows the effect of density on the average payment per employee 
and on land costs per square meter. 
 
[ please insert Table 3 here ] 
 
The wage per employee is calculated by dividing the total salary costs by the number of 
employees present at the last year of reporting. The land price variable is the average 
price paid per square meter of land with a residential zoning plan within the Corop 
regions in 2006. The data stem from the Dutch Land Registry, which files all property 
and land transactions in the Netherlands.  
We control for size, age, and industry effects. It can be seen that salaries are higher in 
dense areas, ceteris paribus. Increasing the density by 100% will increase the average pay 
per employee with 6.3% for Corop areas. On a municipality level, this percentage is 
2.1%. Land costs also rise with population density. More specifically, doubling the 
density increases the cost of land by 42.0%. We only report land costs in Corop areas as 
the price per square meter of land is not available at municipality levels.  
 
5. Agglomeration and financial performance 
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In this section we will empirically test the impact of location density on a firm’s 
profitability.  
 
5.1 Urbanization in a Corop region and financial performance  
 
We will first test the relation between density and financial performance on Corop 
levels. We measure density in three ways: the number of employees per km2, the number 
of inhabitants per km2, and the address density. Table 4 shows the results. 
 
[ please insert Table 4 here ] 
 
The density variables have a significant negative influence on the average five-year 
profitability. The statistical significance holds for all of the density measures employed in 
Table 4. An increase of the density (employees per km2) with 100% will decrease the 
average return on assets by 0.012. For instance settling in Rotterdam (488 
employees/km2) instead of Almere (258 employees/km2) increases the density measure 
with 89%. For a firm that has an average return on assets of 10% in Almere, a similar 
firm in Rotterdam has an expected average return of 8.9% (0.1 – 0.012 * 0.89). The 
coefficients for inhabitants per km2 and address density are -0.013 and -0.020, 
respectively. 
Table 4 further shows that larger firms are on average more profitable. It has to be 
taken into account that our sample comprises single-establishment firms, which are on 
average relatively small compared to multiple-location firms, but have a stronger link 
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with their place of business. Leverage decreases the average earnings before interest, 
taxes, and depreciation as a percentage of total assets. In accordance with a risk-return 
tradeoff, firms with higher earnings volatility have on average higher return on assets.   
 
5.2 Urbanization in a municipality region and financial performance  
 
In the Netherlands there are multiple areas in which relatively dense municipalities 
are surrounded by regions with lower density. Examples are cities in the rural North of 
the country. In a Corop, the resulting density variable will balance the high and low 
density regions. To examine whether the mitigation of high density cities has an impact 
on the results of Table 4, we analyze the influence of density on municipality level in 
Table 5.  
 
[ please insert Table 5 here ] 
 
Table 5 shows that the significantly negative relation between the employees per km2 
and profitability is also present on the municipality level. The other two measures for 
urbanization are not significant. Also, the economical impact of density is smaller on the 
municipality level than on the Corop level: the coefficient decreases from -0.012 in Table 
4 to -0.004 in Table 5 for the variable employees per km2. 
Our finding that the impact of density is stronger on Corop levels can be explained by 
the fact that density on a Corop level is more moderate. On the municipality level the 
density measure often differs substantially among adjoining regions, as could be seen in 
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Fig. 1. Firms that settle in relatively low-density municipalities may still be influenced by 
adjoining high-density regions. These interaction problems are lower for Corop areas, due 
to their size and moderation.    
 
5.3 Localization and performance 
 
There have been various studies on the effects of clusters. A typical example of a 
cluster is Silicon Valley. Although Silicon Valley would not correspond to the highest 
density levels in terms of employees or inhabitants per km2, it does correspond to a high 
value for industry related employment per km2. The clustering of technological 
companies in Silicon Valley is not likely to largely influence the profitability of for 
example, an agricultural company in this area. It could however largely benefit other 
technological firms. In the Netherlands, areas like Silicon Valley are scarce and certainly 
less pronounced. Still, clustering is a worldwide phenomenon and therefore also exists in 
the Netherlands (Kloosterman and Lambregts, 2001). In this section we will test the 
influence of industry related density on firm performance.    
We only estimate our model for industries with more than 150 observations. These 
industries are ‘manufacturing’, ‘construction’, ‘wholesale and trade’, ‘transport, storage 
and communication’, and ‘real estate, renting, and business services’. Fig. 3 shows the 
dispersion of industry specific employment on a Corop level across the country and 
displays comparable patterns across industries. 
 
[ please insert Figure 3 here ] 
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Testing localization effects is not based on relative specialization but on absolute levels 
of industry specific employment density. Although industry specific employment 
resembles urbanization patterns to a large extent, some industry specialization differences 
are visible. All industries show density peaks in the west of the country and in the densely 
populated southern tip of the Netherlands. The construction industry is most evenly 
spread across Corop regions while ‘real estate, renting and business activities’ is the 
industry with the highest dispersion across the country. Table 6 shows the results of our 
regression analysis. 
 
[ please insert Table 6 here ] 
 
It can be seen that the relation between industry related density and performance for 
firms in the ‘manufacturing’ industry is negative with a coefficient of -0.017, but this 
effect is not significant at the 5% level (it is significant at the 10% level). For the 
‘construction’ and ‘wholesale and trade’ sectors the coefficients are -0.018 and -0.014, 
respectively, and these effects are significant at the 5% level. The sector ‘real estate, 
renting, and business services’ has a negative effect which is only significant at the 10% 
level. The effect of industry related density on performance is insignificant for the 
industry of ‘transport, storage and communication’. The results are similar on a 
municipality level (not reported). In general, we can conclude that the negative relation 
between density and financial performance is apparent for both localization and 
urbanization issues. 
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6. Additional analyses 
 
In this section, we will test the robustness of our findings for our measure of 
agglomeration and our measure of profitability. We also examine real options, the cost of 
capital, endogeneity issues, and potential effects of the business cycle.  
 
6.1 Measures of agglomeration: Unequal density of production 
 
Throughout this paper we have used measures of agglomeration that are scaled by the 
land area of the Corop or municipality. One potential problem raised by Ciccone (2002), 
is the assumption of constant production density throughout the geographic areas. This 
assumption is unrealistic as some areas have large portions of agricultural land combined 
with dense agglomerations. If the companies in our sample operate in the denser parts of 
the area, the low average employment density of the overall region could be misleading. 
To test this effect we estimate the relation between firm performance and agglomeration 
by using the non-agricultural employment per non-agricultural square kilometer of land 
area. We only perform the analysis on a Corop level as the impact of agricultural land use 
on the results would be largest for this level of geographic aggregation. Non-agricultural 
employment is the total employment in the Corop minus the number of employees in 
farming, forestry, and fishery industries. The measure for non-agricultural land area is the 
total land area of the Corop region minus land used by companies that earn at least 2/3 of 
their revenue from agricultural or commercial forestry activities and is provided by the 
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Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. Our analysis indicates that the proportion of 
agricultural land varies between 13% and 78% with an average of 54%. The weight of 
agricultural employment has a range from 0.2% to 8.8% and is on average 1.8%. In 
untabulated analysis, we replicate our analysis on density and firm performance for non-
agricultural land and employment, and find the results to be relatively similar: a doubling 
in non-agricultural employment density decreases the average return on assets by 1.5%, 
which is slightly more than the 1.2% for general urbanization.  
 
6.2 Measures of profitability 
 
Our measure of profitability in Section 5 is the five-year average of the return on 
assets. The returns on assets are the earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
(ebitda) divided by the total assets at the end of the book-year. We focus on ebitda 
because this measure is expected to be strongly related to firms’ cash flows (more than 
for example net earnings). In untabulated analyses, we have tested whether our results 
would be different if we use ebit as a percentage of total assets for our dependent 
variable. We find very similar results.  
 Scaling by total assets is in line with a large literature on firms’ profitability. Still, in 
robustness tests, we employ alternative scaling variables. First, we scale by total assets 
minus fixed assets like buildings and land. This additional test is important as the value of 
fixed assets is likely to relate to the density of the location (due to for example a 
substitution of labor for capital when labor is more expensive). Columns (1)-(3) of Table 
7 show the results for the Corop areas. 
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[ please insert Table 7 here ] 
 
It can be seen that the relation between density and financial performance is again 
significantly negative for all three measures of density. Hence, our findings are robust for 
scaling by non-fixed assets. Note though that the t-statistics are lower than if we scale by 
total assets. Also, the R2s are reduced when we scale by non-fixed assets. Firm risk, 
which is measured as the standard deviation of return on assets, and firm leverage do not 
have a statistically significant effect on financial performance when we scale this 
performance by non-fixed assets.  
Second, we have scaled ebitda by total sales (not reported for parsimony). We have 
1,715 observations for this analysis. In all of the three density measures the effect of 
density on profit over sales is negative (coefficients of -0.908, -0.906, and -0.949, 
respectively), and this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level in two of the three 
estimations. Only the effect of inhabitants per km2 on profit over sales is not significant at 
the 5% level (but it is significant at the 10% level).   
 
6.3 Real options and the cost of capital 
 
A potential issue with looking at financial performance is that it does not necessarily 
take into account that a location provides real options. It could be argued that locating in 
dense areas provides real options for firms by facilitating connections to for example 
capital suppliers and law-experts. If these real options do not show up in the five-year 
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average return on assets, then we are likely to underestimate the benefits of locating in 
dense areas. We therefore examine whether our results change when we increase the time 
period for which we measure average return on assets. To reduce losing too many 
observations, we increase our time period to eight years. We expect that for the single-
establishment firms in our sample most of the real options that a location provides will 
have shown up in the financial performance in these eight years. Columns (4)-(6) of 
Table 7 show the results for the Corop areas. 
  We find that the negative effect of density on firm performance remains present 
when we calculate financial performance over an eight year period. Since real options 
materialize into cash flows over the years and hence increase the profitability for firms 
with more real options, this finding indicates that locating in dense areas reduces 
financial performance, even when real options are likely to have materialized. The results 
in Table 7 also show that the economic significance remains very similar for our five-
year and eight-year measure. Given that we expect different firms to exercise their real 
options at different times, it is very likely that at least some of the firms’ real options 
have materialized in the period between five and eight years. Our finding that the results 
of our five- and eight-year measures are similar therefore indicates that the real options 
are not likely to differ strongly between firms in low and high density areas in the 
Netherlands.  
We also examine the interest that firms pay on their debt, to analyze whether firms in 
high density areas have lower or higher costs of capital than firms in low density areas. 
This analysis relates to Degryse and Ongena (2005), who find that for Belgian firms the 
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loan rates decrease with distance between the firm and the lending bank, while it 
increases with the distance between the firm and competing banks. 
We have 780 observations for this analysis. We estimate the regression specification 
Interest cost = γ0 + γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm age + γ5Risk + 
γ6Tangibility + γ7Industry + ε, in which density is the number of employees per km2 in a 
Corop area, and tangibility is fixed assets divided by total assets. We scale total interest 
by total debt for our first interest variable, and by long-term debt for our second interest 
variable. We find that the coefficient is negative for both our interest variables 
(coefficients of -0.001 and -0.002), but not statistically significant (t-statistics of -0.95 
and -0.09). Our results are similar for our other density measures. We do therefore not 
find evidence that the cost of capital differs for firms in low and high density areas in the 
Netherlands.  
We have to stress that the Netherlands is a relatively small country. Even for the most 
rural areas in the Netherlands a potential capital supplier will not be very far away. In 
larger countries, density perhaps has stronger effects on firms’ cost of capital and real 
options, which could provide benefits for locating in dense areas.  
 
6.4 Endogeneity 
 
The choice whether to start a company in a high or a low density area might be 
endogenous. That is, whether or not a firm is founded in a high density area can depend 
on various characteristics, like the firm’s industry. We will estimate a two-stage model in 
which we control for two effects on whether or not to start-up a firm in a high density 
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area. The first effect we take into account is the firm’s industry. The type of industry and 
location are related, as for some industries specific natural resources have to be present 
(e.g., mining companies). The second effect is start-up cohorts: over time, the popularity 
of certain cities, areas, or density levels may have fluctuated. We let a start-up cohort 
consist of twenty years.  
Our model will control for selection bias, based on Heckman’s (1979) treatment 
effect. This self-selection model deals with the possibility that the dependent variable is 
endogenous beyond the impact of observable characteristics. Firms may self-select into 
their preferred choice: there can be unobserved characteristics, like the place of residence 
of a company’s founder, that have an effect on where to locate a firm.  
We convert our density measure to a binary variable: the dummy ‘high density’ will 
equal one for firms in which the Corop’s or municipality’s number of employees per km2 
is above the median, and zero for locations with below-median employees per km2. We 
first estimate a probit model on the choice to start a firm in a high or low density area and 
then calculate the inverse Mills ratio. This ratio is added to the regression as an additional 
variable to correct for possible selection bias.  
 
[ please insert Table 8 here ] 
 
The density dummies in Table 8 have a negative sign. Apparently, density and 
performance are also negatively related when controlling for selection bias. The impact of 
the density dummy on the Corop level is significant at the 5% level, while at the 
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municipality level it is not. The inverse Mills ratio provides information on self-selection. 
It can be seen that we do not find strong self-selection bias for our estimations. 
The difference between the dummies on a Corop and municipality level is partially 
due to the construction of the dummies: the municipality dummy equals one when the 
number of employees per km2 exceeds 606 (which is the median). In a Corop area the 
median is only 368. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the density dummies is less 
than the explanatory power of the density variables in our previous analyses, as 
converting a variable into a dummy automatically implies a loss of information. 
 
6.5 The effect of the business cycle and cross-sectional differences 
 
We measure the five-year average of the return on assets for the firms in our sample 
for the final year in which that firm is included in our database. In Section 5, we do not 
require this year to be 2006 (the last year in our sample), to reduce the impact of 
survivorship bias. Potentially, this method results in a new bias, as we compare firms in 
different time periods. A firm in a bull period is expected to have higher returns on assets 
than a firm in a bear period, even if the firm in the bull market underperforms compared 
to other firms in that period. To examine whether differences in the economic cycle drive 
our results, Column (1) of Table 9 reports the results for only our observations in 2006 
(i.e. the return on assets for all of these firms is measured over the period 2002-2006).  
 
[ please insert Table 9 here ] 
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It can be seen that the effect of density on financial performance is still significantly 
negative, with a coefficient of -0.019 and a t-statistic of -2.56. In Column (2), we 
examine the period 1999-2003, in which economic growth was relatively low. We again 
find a significantly negative effect of density on financial performance, and the economic 
effect has doubled (coefficient of -0.039).  
We also test whether the observed negative relation between density and financial 
performance is present in both young and old firms. That is, the relation might only be 
present in the early stages in a firm’s life cycle, and not in later stages. Columns (3) and 
(4) report the results for young firms (existing for 1-10 years) and older firms (existing 
for over 10 years). It can be seen that the negative relation is present in both sub-samples. 
As a final robustness test we only look at the sub-sample of firms with an above-median 
size. The reason is that the profitability measures for small firms could be affected by the 
wages that entrepreneurs pay themselves. For larger firms, the profitability measure is 
less likely to be strongly affected by the wage of the entrepreneur. Column (5) of Table 9 
shows that the negative relation is also present for our sub-sample of relatively large 
firms. Hence, we conclude that the negative effect of density on firm performance is 
robust for effects of the business cycle and the wages of the entrepreneur.     
 
7. Potential explanations for our results and directions for future research 
 
The focus of this paper is on empirically testing the relation between agglomeration 
and financial performance. Our findings are particularly interesting in light of a spatial 
equilibrium. The no arbitrage relationship of firms states that firms must be indifferent 
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over space (Glaeser, 2007). Why would firms still settle in dense cities, given that these 
locations are negatively related with return on assets? One would expect each firm to 
settle in an area that provides the most favorable conditions, which creates a spatial 
equilibrium.  
A potential explanation for our results is that circumstances change over time, thereby 
temporarily shifting settlement conditions over time and space. In a changing society the 
optimal location twenty years ago may not be the optimal location today, while moving 
costs of firms are certainly not zero as assumed by standard equilibrium models. The cost 
of living in the largest cities rose sharply with an increase in house prices over the last 
decades. These changes in house prices push up wage demands in the cities and 
subsequently increase labor costs for companies in these areas. Given that relocating is 
costly, temporal disequilibria can exist.  
Also, others factors, like prestige, might drive location choices. Especially for the 
relatively small firms in our sample, the preferences of the owners will have an effect on 
the location choice. An entrepreneur is likely to start his business in a region he is 
familiar with. In line with Glaeser (2007), it is also likely that entrepreneurs choose their 
firm’s location close to a region in which they would like to live, balancing profitability 
and the general quality of life. 
Although these potential explanations are difficult to test in practice, we can provide 
some insight in whether entrepreneurs choose their firm’s location close to a region in 
which they want to live by including a liveability index in our analysis. We obtain this 
liveability index for the Netherlands from the “Atlas voor Gemeenten 2005,” which 
reports a liveability score that is calculated for the 50 largest municipalities in the 
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Netherlands, based on eight different factors. These factors are safety (based on an index 
consisting of reported crimes), the ratio of residences that are owned compared to rented, 
the proximity to nature, the proximity to jobs, a cultural score, quality of the restaurants, 
the existence of a university, and a score for the historical look of the municipality. 
If entrepreneurs balance their firms’ profitability and the general quality of life, we 
expect that firms in municipalities with a high liveability score have a lower average 
profitability than firms in municipalities with a low score. That is, entrepreneurs would 
require a premium to locate their firm in a municipality in which they would rather not 
live. Column (6) of Table 9 shows the effect of liveability on the five-year average return 
on assets for the 50 largest municipalities. It can be observed that the relation between the 
liveability index and firm performance is significantly negative, which is in line with our 
expectations. Panel B of Table 9 reports the average and median five-year average ROA 
for quartiles based on the liveability score. Firms in the lowest liveability quartile have an 
average return on assets of 11.4% (median of 10.1%). In the highest quartile, the 
profitability is the lowest: the mean is 8.6% and the median 6.6%.  
This analysis provides evidence in line with the conjunction that the owners of the 
single-establishment firms in our sample balance profitability and the general quality of 
life. These findings do however need to be interpreted with caution. We only have data 
on liveability for 50 municipalities, which are all relatively dense. Further research is 
necessary to disentangle the exact relations between density, liveability, and financial 
performance. Also, a direction for further research is to examine other factors that may 
lead to disequilibria. 
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Our findings might be a general characteristic of relatively small countries. It would 
be interesting to examine the effects in larger countries. For example, industry-related 
density in the Netherlands cannot be compared to various clusters around the world, like 
Silicon Valley in the US. We do not question the positive effects of these clusters. 
Furthermore, since our study focuses on firms with a single location, it would be 
interesting to examine the relation between location density and financial performance for 
somewhat larger, public firms. As these firms are substantially different in terms of size, 
scope, and networks, the choice of location encounters many new facets.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
Although the benefits and costs of agglomeration have been widely documented, the 
tradeoff between these factors is a relatively uncultivated area. In this paper we study 
agglomeration effects in the Netherlands. With a detailed database of single-
establishment companies, we are able to capture the productivity benefits of 
agglomeration density: firms that settle in dense areas portrait a higher turnover per 
employee. We also find the costs of agglomeration to be present in our sample: labor 
costs per employee and land rents are considerably higher in dense areas. 
Our study focuses on combining the costs and benefits into a single measure, which is 
financial performance. In case the benefits of density overshadow the costs, firms in 
denser areas should outperform their equivalents in areas with lower density. When the 
costs of agglomeration are higher than the benefits, we expect firms in regions with lower 
density to perform better.  
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We find that the density of an area has a negative effect on firm performance. This 
effect is more present in Corop regions than in municipalities. We measure urbanization 
in various ways: employees per km2, inhabitants per km2, and address density. The 
existence of the negative effect turns out to be irrespective of our measurement of 
density.  
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1 For an extensive review of this literature see Holmes and Stevens (2004). 
2 Papers that examine the relation between location and profitability include Boassen and MacPherson 
(2001), and Vaessen and Keeble (1995). Boassen and MacPherson study listed US firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry and find the returns to be higher for clustered firms than for non-clustered firms. 
Vaessen and Keeble (1995) use survey results to study growth-oriented firms in the UK and find the profits 
of firms in various regional environments to be relatively similar. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) study the 
effect of corporate headquarter location on stock returns. They find strong co-movement in the stock 
returns of firms headquartered in the same geographic area. 
3 The sample size differs across specifications in our empirical analysis due to incomplete reporting of 
variables. As we base our analysis on privately owned firms, disclosure of information is not subject to the 
same regulations as for public firms. We have 3,597 firms with all the necessary information to be included 
in our estimations of the effects of density on a firm’s profitability. 
4 Glaeser (1998) provides an extensive discussion of whether cities are dying and concludes that 
information spillovers will continue to be important, even in an age of cheap and fast communication. 
5 In robustness tests, we have tested whether our results would change if we only include firms that still 
exist. We find that both the signs and significance of our main results remain unaltered.  
6 Note that the increase of observed productivity is not necessarily completely due to employees being more 
productive: part of the effect could be explained by employees being substituted for machines in areas in 
which labor costs are high. 
7 Note that location costs could be partly mitigated by tenure possibilities. That is, companies in denser 
urban areas generally have a much wider array of tenure possibilities than companies in more rural areas. 
For example, real estate leasing possibilities are more abundant in more densely populated areas, and this is 
also the case for sale and leaseback (S&L) transaction possibilities: investors that form the counterpart in 
S&L transactions are more likely to find a replacement tenant in more densely populated areas, which 
limits their risk and increases the likelihood of engaging in an S&L transaction. 
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Figure 1. Firm location and population density on Corop level 
This figure shows the location of each firm in our sample based on a six digit postal code. The geographic 
areas represent the 40 Corop regions in the Netherlands.  
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Figure 2. Population density on Corop and municipality level  
This figure shows the population density, measured as the number of inhabitants per square kilometer of 
land area. Panel (a) shows population density for 40 Corop areas and Panel (b) for 443 municipalities in the 
Netherlands.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 3. Employment density for specific industries  
This figure shows the density of employment for industry classifications in accordance with the statistical 
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, Rev. 1.1 (2002). Employment density is 
measured as the number of employees per square kilometer, for 40 Corop areas in the Netherlands for 
different industries. Panel (a) shows information for the ‘manufacturing’ industry. Panel (b) represents the 
‘wholesale and trade’ industry and Panel (c), (d) and (e) represent the ‘transport, storage and 
communication’, ‘construction’ and ‘real estate, renting and business activities’ industries respectively. 
Scales are based on quantiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for our total sample. Total assets are in millions of Euros. Leverage is 
total debt divided by total assets. Firm age is the year of reporting minus the year the firm was founded. 
ROA stands for return on assets and is calculated by dividing the earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation by the total assets. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the return on assets over the 
last five years of the firm’s reporting. Total assets and leverage are reported for the firm’s last year of 
reporting. Turnover per employee and payment per employee are total turnover and total salary costs 
divided by the total number of employees. Land costs reflect the price of residential land per square meter. 
Employment and population density is measured as respectively the number of employees or inhabitants 
per square kilometer of land area within a Corop region or municipality. Address density is a measure for 
the concentration of human activity. It measures the average number of addresses (including residential, 
commercial, and public properties) in a one kilometer radius area around each address within the defined 
agglomeration. 
Firm characteristics N  Mean  Median 
Total assets  13,161  29.557  4.265 
Leverage 10,893  0.618  0.669 
Firm age 13,161  36.512  19.000 
Five-year mean ROA 4,085  0.116  0.101 
Risk 4,085  0.093  0.063 
Turnover per employee 6,743  519  167 
Payment per employee 1,429  42  39 
Land costs 13,161  451  433 
      
Density measures (Corop)      
Employees per km2 13,161  457  368 
Inhabitants per km2 13,161  963  845 
Address density 13,161  2,087  1,649 
      
Density measures (Municipality)      
Employees per km2 13,161  4,931  606 
Inhabitants per km2 13,161  1,374  709 
Address density 13,161  1,562  1,150 
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Table 2. Density and the revenues per employee 
This table reports the influence of density on firms’ productivity, and tests the model Productivity = γ0 + 
γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Firm age + γ4Industry + ε. Productivity is measured as the total turnover divided by 
the total number of employees. Density is the number of employees per km2. Firm size is measured as total 
assets. We take the natural logarithm of the productivity, density, and size variable. The variable firm age 
has a maximum of 20. T-test statistics are based on geographically clustered standard errors and appear in 
parentheses. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Turnover per employee 
 Corop  Municipality 
Employees per km2 0.060**  
(3.03) 
 0.004 
(0.46) 
Size 0.777**  
(43.73) 
 0.775** 
(39.77) 
Firm age -0.034**  
(-13.88) 
 -0.035**  
(-10.98) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
N 6,743  6,743 
R2 0.332  0.328 
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Table 3. Density, employment costs, and land costs 
This table reports the influence of density on firms’ direct employment costs, i.e. wages. We test the model 
Employment costs = γ0 + γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Firm age + γ4Industry + ε. Employment costs are 
measured as the total salary costs divided by the total number of employees. Land costs reflect the price of 
residential land per square meter. Density is the number of employees per km2. Firm size is measured as 
total assets. We take the natural logarithm of the employment cost, land cost, density, and size variable. The 
variable firm age has a maximum of 20. T-test statistics are based on geographically clustered standard 
errors and appear in parentheses. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Payment per employee  Land costs 
 Corop  Municipality  Corop 
Employees per km2 0.063**  
(6.59) 
 0.021**  
(4.66) 
 0.420** 
(8.67) 
Size 0.056**  
(4.99) 
 0.057**  
(3.53) 
 -0.001 
(-0.06) 
Firm age -0.011  
(-0.57) 
 -0.007 
 (-0.33) 
 0.001** 
(2.79) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1,429  1,429  13,161 
R2 0.086  0.073  0.755 
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Table 4. Density of Corop and firm performance  
This table reports the influence of Corop density on firm performance, and tests the model Profitability = γ0 
+ γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm age + γ5Risk + γ6Industry + ε. Profitability is measured as the 
five-year average return on assets. Density is the number of employees per km2, the number of inhabitants 
per km2, or the address density. We take the natural logarithm of the density variables. Size is the logarithm 
of total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The variable firm age has a maximum of 20. 
Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the return on assets over the last five years of the firm’s 
reporting. T-test statistics are based on geographically clustered standard errors and appear in parentheses. 
**, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Five-year mean ROA 
Employees per km2 -0.012* 
(-2.65) 
    
Inhabitants per km2   -0.013* 
(-2.50) 
  
Address density     -0.020** 
(-3.68) 
Size 0.019** 
(4.63) 
 0.018** 
(4.56) 
 0.019** 
(4.67) 
Leverage -0.079** 
(-6.65) 
 -0.079** 
(-6.63) 
 -0.079** 
(-6.63) 
Firm age 0.001 
(1.01) 
 0.001 
(1.02) 
 0.001 
(0.98) 
Risk 0.266** 
(4.70) 
 0.266** 
(4.70) 
 0.266** 
(4.72) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3,597  3,597  3,597 
R2 0.065  0.065  0.066 
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Table 5. Density of municipality and firm performance  
This table reports the influence of municipality density on firm performance, and tests the model 
Profitability = γ0 + γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm age + γ5Risk + γ6Industry + ε. Profitability is 
measured as the average five-year return on assets. Density is the number of employees per km2, the 
number of inhabitants per km2, or the address density. We take the natural logarithm of the density 
variables. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The variable 
firm age has a maximum of 20. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the return on assets over the 
last five years of the firm’s reporting. T-test statistics are based on geographically clustered standard errors 
and appear in parentheses. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Five-year mean ROA 
Employees per km2 -0.004** 
 (-2.69) 
    
Inhabitants per km2   -0.004  
(-1.21) 
  
Address density     -0.005  
(-1.24) 
Size 0.018**  
(4.28) 
 0.017**  
(4.20) 
 0.017** 
 (4.21) 
Leverage -0.080**  
(-7.82) 
 -0.080** 
 (-7.71) 
 -0.080** 
 (-7.72) 
Firm age 0.001 
 (0.70) 
 0.001  
(0.72) 
 0.001 
 (0.74) 
Risk 0.236**  
(3.55) 
 0.237**  
(3.56) 
 0.238** 
 (3.59) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3,597  3,597  3,597 
R2 0.060  0.058  0.059 
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Table 6. Industry-related density and firm performance  
This table reports the influence of industry-related density in a Corop area on firm performance, and tests 
the model Profitability = γ0 + γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm age + γ5Risk + ε. Profitability is 
computed as the five-year average return on assets. Density is the number of industry-specific employees 
per km2. We take the natural logarithm of the density variable. Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The variable firm age has a maximum of 20. Risk is measured 
as the standard deviation of the return on assets over the last five years of the firm’s reporting. T-test 
statistics are based on geographically clustered standard errors and appear in parentheses. **, * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Five-year mean ROA 
 Manufacturing Construction Trade Transportation Real estate, 
renting, and 
business services 
Constant 0.192** 
(3.55) 
0.153* 
(2.12) 
0.103** 
(2.80) 
0.012 
 (0.18) 
0.093** 
 (2.92) 
Employees per km2 -0.017 
(-1.98) 
-0.018* 
(-2.07) 
-0.014* 
 (-2.03) 
-0.008 
 (-0.73) 
-0.008  
(-1.85) 
Size 0.003 
(0.24) 
0.033* 
(2.36) 
0.021** 
(3.69) 
0.025* 
(2.38) 
0.022**  
(3.13) 
Leverage -0.122** 
(-4.99) 
-0.099**  
(-2.74) 
-0.081** 
(-4.80) 
-0.091*  
(-2.54) 
-0.043  
(-1.71) 
Firm age 0.002  
(1.45) 
-0.003  
(-1.35) 
0.001 
(0.99) 
0.003  
(1.25) 
-0.001 
 (-0.43) 
Risk 0.225  
(1.18) 
0.207* 
(2.05) 
0.619** 
(7.74) 
0.781** 
 (2.86) 
0.145  
(1.34) 
N 874 395 1,186 184 628 
R2 0.065 0.060 0.153 0.153 0.028 
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Table 7. Alternative performance measures  
This table reports the influence of Corop density on firm performance, and tests the model Profitability = γ0 
+ γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm age + γ5Risk + γ6Industry + ε. Profitability is measured in two 
different ways. In columns (1)-(3), it is measured as the average five-year return on non-fixed assets. In 
columns (4)-(6), profitability is measured as the average eight-year return on total assets. Returns relate to 
firms’ reported ebitda. Density is the number of employees per km2, the number of inhabitants per km2, or 
the address density. We take the natural logarithm of the density variables. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The variable firm age has a maximum of 20. Risk is 
measured as the standard deviation of the return on assets over the last five years of the firm’s reporting. T-
test statistics are based on geographically clustered standard errors and appear in parentheses. **, * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Five-year mean returns scaled by 
non-fixed assets 
Eight-year mean ROA 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Employees per km2 -0.066* 
(-2.12) 
   -0.012* 
(-2.48) 
  
Inhabitants per km2  -0.071* 
(-2.13) 
   -0.012* 
(2.42) 
 
Address density   -0.066* 
(-2.13) 
   -0.022** 
(-3.45) 
Size 0.042* 
(2.29) 
0.042* 
(2.26) 
0.040* 
(2.11) 
 0.015** 
(3.39) 
0.015** 
(3.41) 
0.015** 
(3.39) 
Leverage -0.096 
(-1.21) 
-0.095 
(-1.20) 
-0.091 
(-1.12) 
 -0.076** 
(-7.22) 
-0.075** 
(-7.22) 
-0.076** 
(-7.16) 
Firm age -0.005 
(-0.58) 
-0.005 
(-0.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.58) 
 0.004 
(1.68) 
0.004 
(1.67) 
0.004 
(1.65) 
Risk 0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 0.240* 
(2.69) 
0.240* 
(2.68) 
0.240* 
(2.69) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,273 3,273 3,273  2,245 2,245 2,245 
R2 0.025 0.024 0.023  0.071 0.071 0.074 
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Table 8. Self-selection test  
This table reports the influence of density on firm performance while controlling for self-selection issues. 
We first estimate a probit model on the choice of settling in a low or high density area. The explanatory 
variables in this model are industry dummies and start-up cohorts. We calculate the inverse Mills ratio and 
add this ratio to our basic estimation model Profitability = γ0 + γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm 
age + γ5Risk + γ6Industry + ε, to control for possible selection bias. Profitability is measured as the average 
five-year return on assets. ‘High density’ equals one when the Corop’s or municipality’s density score for 
the number of employees per km2 is above the median, and is zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The variable firm age has a maximum of 20. Risk is 
measured as the standard deviation of the return on assets over the last five years of the firm’s reporting. T-
test statistics appear in parentheses. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Five-year mean ROA 
 Corop  Municipality 
High density -0.247* 
(-2.02) 
 -0.053 
(-0.46) 
Size 0.017** 
(4.78) 
 0.018** 
(5.00) 
Leverage -0.077** 
(-8.48) 
 -0.079** 
(-8.30) 
Firm age 0.001 
(1.36) 
 0.001 
(0.95) 
Risk 0.265** 
(10.63) 
 0.237** 
(9.19) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.141 
(1.87) 
 0.026 
(0.36) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
N 3,597  3,597 
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Table 9. The business cycle, cross-sectional differences, and liveability  
This table reports the influence of the employees per km2 of the Corop on firm performance for various 
sub-samples. The table also shows the effect of the liveability of municipalities. Columns (1)-(5) of Panel A 
test the model Profitability = γ0 + γ1Density + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4Firm age + γ5Risk + γ6Industry + ε. 
Profitability is measured as the five-year average return on assets. Density is the number of employees per 
km2. We take the natural logarithm of the density variables. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Leverage is 
total debt divided by total assets. The variable firm age has a maximum of 20. Risk is measured as the 
standard deviation of the return on assets over the last five years of the firm’s reporting. For Column (6) of 
Panel A, we focus on municipalities, and we replace our density variable with a score for the liveability of a 
municipality. This score is based on a report by “Atlas voor Gemeenten” in 2005. T-test statistics are based 
on geographically clustered standard errors and appear in parentheses. Panel B reports the average and 
median five-year mean ROA for different quartiles based on the liveability score. The difference of means 
t-statistic relates to the difference between the lowest and highest quartile, and assumes unequal variances. 
**, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
Panel A 
 Five-year mean ROA 
 2002-
2006 
1999-
2003 
Young 
firms 
Old firms Large 
firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employees per km2 -0.019* 
(-2.56) 
-0.039** 
(-3.77) 
-0.023** 
(-2.78) 
-0.011* 
(-2.44) 
-0.009* 
(-2.07) 
 
Liveability score      -0.006* 
(-2.36) 
Size 0.021** 
(2.90) 
0.014* 
(2.07) 
0.023 
(1.85) 
0.019** 
(4.65) 
0.026** 
(4.30) 
0.010* 
(2.14) 
Leverage -0.066* 
(-2.69) 
-0.020 
(-0.70) 
-0.089* 
(-2.68) 
-0.079** 
(-6.49) 
-0.051** 
(-5.13) 
-0.068** 
(-5.13) 
Firm age 0.001 
(0.72) 
0.005 
(1.66) 
-0.006 
(-1.88) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
0.004 
(1.93) 
0.002 
(1.77) 
Risk 0.229 
(1.37) 
0.500** 
(5.31) 
0.171 
(1.15) 
0.286* 
(2.17) 
0.487** 
(3.94) 
0.212** 
(5.88) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 622 818 278 3,319 1,798 1,729 
R2 0.071 0.089 0.160 0.066 0.136 0.054 
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Panel B 
 Lowest 
liveability 
score 
Somewhat low 
liveability 
score 
Somewhat high 
liveability 
score 
Highest 
liveability 
score 
Difference of 
means t-
statistic 
Mean ROA 0.114 0.121 0.107 0.086 -2.54** 
Median ROA 0.101 0.099 0.095 0.066  
N 434 433 427 435  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
